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ABSTRACT 
Given a tournament T, the tournament game is: Two players independently 
pick a node of T. If both pick the same node, the game is tied. Otherwise, 
the player whose node is at the tail of the arc connecting the two nodes wins. 
Fisher and Ryan showed that this game has a unique optimal strategy. For a 
tournament game on a random n node tournament, we find the probability that 
the optimal strategy uses k nodes with nonzero probability. 
Fisher and Ryan [l, 21 studied a generalization of “scissors, paper, and 
stone” called tournament games. Given a tournament, two players inde- 
pendently pick a node. If both pick the same node, the game is tied. 
Otherwise, the player whose node is at the tail of the arc connecting the 
two nodes wins. Fisher and Ryan showed there is a unique optimal strategy 
for this game which uses an odd number of nodes with nonzero probability. 
Further, they showed that the nonzero probabilities in this strategy are 
fractions with odd denominators (see Figure 1). Laslier, Laffond, and Le 
Breton [3] independently proved these results in a different setting. 
For any tournament T, let S(T) be the nodes used with nonzero prob- 
ability in the optimal strategy for the tournament game on T. Let an n 
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FIG. 1. The optimal strategy of a tournament. The strategy is to play one of the 
nodes according the probabilities shown above. This strategy wins as least as often as 
it loses against any node an opponent might play. Since the game is symmetric, no 
strategy could win more often it loses. So the strategy is optimal. 
node random tournament be a tournament picked with equal probability 
among the 2(y) tournaments on n nodes. How large is S(T) for a random 
tournament T? 
THEOREM. Let T, be an n node random tournament. Then 
prob(lS(T,)I = k) = ( > ; 2+-l) if Ic isodd, 
0 if k is even. 
Proof. Since IS( is odd, prob((S(T,)I = k) = 0 for even k. 
For odd k, we must find the number of tournaments T with ITI = n 
and IS(T)1 = k. There are (i) h c oices for S C T so that S(T) = S. Let 
N1 and Nz be the number of ways of interconnecting S and S’ (the nodes 
of T that are not in S), respectively. Fisher and Ryan showed that there 
are 2(kT1) tournaments U with IUI = k and IS(U)1 = k. So 
Nl = 2(‘;7. 
Since IS’1 = n - k and there are no restrictions within S’, we have 
N2 = 2(“;‘). 
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Let Nrz be the number of ways of connecting S’ to S. Let a E S’, 
and let p be the probability that the optimal strategy beats a. With no 
restrictions, there are 2k ways to connect a to S. However, p must be at 
least i. Further, since the probabilities in the optimal strategy are fractions 
with odd denominators, no subset of S has probability 3. So for each way 
of connecting S to a with p > 4, there is a way (by reversing the arcs 
between a and S) that p < i. Thus there are 2”-’ ways to connect S to a 
so that p > i. Therefore IV12 = 2(k-1)(“-k), and 
prob(lS(W = k) 
= number of n node tournaments with IS(T)/ = k 
number of n node tournaments 
= (2 NlNd% 
2(t) = 
(;)2(*1’)2(k-l)(n-k)2(“;‘) 
2(Y) 
XI 
What is the average size of S(T) for an n node tournament? Using the 
theorem, 
E(IS(T,)I) = 2 k(;)2-(“‘1 = n2-(n-1) 5 (;I :> 
k=O k=O 
k is odd k is odd 
= n2-(7+l) (” I, 1) = n2-(n-l)2n-2 = ;. 
k is even 
So on the average, the optimal strategy uses half of the nodes. 
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